The Sweets service, which positioned itself as an international payment aggregator for High/Low Risk projects, based on the totality of market participants' testimonies and data from independent reputation verification services, demonstrates signs of a classic exit scam: cessation of fund withdrawals, blocking of client dashboards, and a complete refusal to communicate. According to a check by the ScamAdviser portal on July 1, 2026, the trust level of the domain sweetsfintech.info is assessed as low, and the resource is flagged as potentially fraudulent.

The official presentation of the service was published by user Sweets PSP on March 30, 2026. The material claimed operations since late 2024, the presence of an experienced FinTech team, and a wide pool of international payment solutions covering the Russian Federation, CIS countries, India, Indonesia, Asia, and Africa. Subsequently, according to the author of the publication, they advertised QR solutions with a liquidity of 50+ million per day, the development of CIS geos, and Bank-Bank solutions with a payout conversion rate of up to 99%.

The first red flags were recorded in a comment by user PaySync on May 2, 2026. According to PaySync, funds had not been withdrawn for two days, appeals were being ignored, and support had completely stopped responding. The author characterized the situation as a classic scenario of a project going into an exit scam and initially estimated the amount of frozen funds at $8,000, later clarifying that the total loss reached $12,000 and continued to grow. As PaySync noted, the platform stopped reviewing disputes for large amounts, as a result of which the counterparty was forced to close deals at their own expense so as not to let their own clients down. The evidentiary base is supported by screenshots of correspondence and the dashboard status.

A reaction from Sweets PSP followed on May 3. According to the service representative, he "possessed the same amount of information as the client" and suggested waiting for a decision from the admin staff. On the same day, it was stated that the administration had established contact and the process of closing appeals had begun. However, as reported by user PaySync, in practice, withdrawals were never resumed, responsible accounts stopped reaching out, and deals continued to close with delays or not at all. According to PaySync, the service representatives "kept passing the buck between responsible accounts", none of which gave a specific answer.

By May 5, according to user PaySync, the personal dashboard on the service's website was blocked, which the author regarded as final confirmation of dishonest intentions. It was also noted that an administration representative appeared in group chats but continued to ignore direct appeals, citing technical login problems. Based on the totality of facts, user PaySync concluded that the "Scammers" status was well-deserved.

Forum moderator Helber temporarily removed the warning tag on May 2 following promises from Sweets PSP to resolve the situation, but on May 5, he reinstated it due to the lack of real progress and answers to specific questions. Supermoderator Mask officially recommended against working with the service on May 18, confirming the fact of non-payment of funds since May 2 and the complete ignoring of appeals.

The correlation of the timeline of events — active client attraction in March–April with promises of high liquidity and favorable conditions, the abrupt cessation of payments in May, the blocking of client dashboards, and the refusal to communicate — combined with an independently low trust rating of the domain by ScamAdviser, allows us to qualify Sweets activities as a scheme for the deliberate misappropriation of partners funds followed by the termination of obligations.